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Abstract This is the first study in a large European market which analyzes monthly portfolios
to obtain evidence of equity fund trading around quarterly reports. A new portfolio-weight
approach shows that managers disclose large-cap and well-known stocks with higher returns
and hide the same return-loser stocks in the reporting months. A fund-size agency problem
plays an important role in this window dressing evidence. Fund trading also shows that
managers benefits from the January effect by buying small-cap stocks at the beginning of
the year rather than causing this anomaly.
Keywords Mutual funds .Window dressing . January effect . Agency problem .
Intra-quarter trading
JEL Classification G11 . G12 . G23
1 Introduction
Mutual fund trading in disguise and their consequences are a challenging topic in the financial
literature since the paper of Lakonishok et al. (1991). The potential portfolio manipulation
around disclosures may reveal an uninformative image of the recent management of the fund.
This phenomenon is broadly known as window dressing. Some other papers devoted to study
window dressing in the U.S. equity fund market are He et al. (2004) and Ng and Wang
(2004).1
The above-cited papers document evidence of window dressing analyzing quarterly port-
folios. However, in a recent work, Elton et al. (2010) show that low portfolio data frequency
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1This window dressing phenomenon has also been tested for other financial institutions i.e. for the balance sheet
activity in banks (Kotomin and Winters, 2006).
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(e.g., semi-annual or even quarterly data) may provide misleading evidence regarding mutual
fund behavior because the trades between disclosed portfolio reports (intra-period round-trip
trades) cannot be observed, and because the estimated timing of a trade is imprecise. Higher
frequencies are necessary to obtain accurate conclusions concerning mutual fund trading.
Some recent studies address this problem by conducting tests of some well-known hypotheses
in the U.S. mutual-fund industry. Elton et al. (2012) use monthly holdings to study market
timing ability, and Liao et al. (2010) analyze monthly portfolios to test herding behavior.
Regarding studies on window dressing with lower frequency than quarterly, we can only report
analyses of bond fund portfolios, the studies of Musto (1999) in the U.S. and Ortiz et al. (2012)
in Spain. This paper intends to fill this gap in the literature and analyzes monthly trades in
Spanish equity funds.
Nonetheless, besides the frequency of the data, the key element to draw conclusions on true
window dressing is whether portfolios are disclosed or undisclosed. Specifically, Musto (1999)
was the first study that clearly stated that the test of window dressing requires the use of
disclosed and undisclosed portfolios. Unlike in other well-known markets, managers in Spain
must report to investors on a quarterly basis, which is more frequent than the European
Union’s requirement of semi-annual portfolio reports.2 However, even more relevant, the
Spanish regulator collects monthly portfolios. This study benefits from this unique and official
database of undisclosed reports to offer new insights into mutual fund trading in Spain. In fact,
the use of quarterly data misses 38 % of the trades estimated using monthly data.
The immediate question for investors to evaluate the validity of disclosed portfolios is
whether the intra-quarter trading entails differential returns for the fund; that is, to test whether
the trading in disguise significantly affects fund returns. The unobserved trading of managers
can be creating value for the portfolio but it hides transaction costs at the same time. Our
results show that there is no differential return in calculating hypothetical returns with
disclosed or undisclosed portfolios. This result is in line with Kacperczyk et al. (2008) that
show that the magnitude of unobserved actions is relatively small in the aggregate for a sample
of U.S. equity funds.
The application of Ng and Wang’s (2004) ratios in monthly holdings allows us to better
identify the characteristics of the stocks that managers buy and sell more intensively each
period. This study also contributes to the literature proposing a complementary methodological
approach that analyzes the changes in the portfolio weights as a whole, thereby capturing the
overall effect of the fund trading on the portfolio image.
As far as we know, this is the first analysis of undisclosed monthly portfolios of a sample of
equity funds in the European industry. The analysis of an industry different to the U.S. is
needed also for equity funds, indeed the conclusions of the paper of Ortiz et al. (2012) differ
from the U.S. market (Musto 1999) for bond funds because government bonds are not so
desirable in disclosed portfolios in Spain as in the U.S.
Our empirical analysis is based on the detection of window dressing. We investigate
whether the existence of investment strategies in disguise between quarterly reports result
in trading patterns around the reporting dates that significantly differ from the usual
management practices in the rest of the year (Lakonishok et al. 1991). This is possible
using a monthly undisclosed database. A detailed analysis of the timing and magnitude of
these trades should show whether the portfolios disclosed on a quarterly basis reveal
meaningful information to investors. The results show that managers tend to rebalance
2 European Council Directive 2001/107/EC of 21 January 2002 partially amends Directive 85/611/EEC of 20
December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to Undertakings
for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS).
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their portfolios to disclose well-known stocks in their quarterly reports. In addition to this
finding, managers tend to buy and increase the portfolio weights of the smallest-cap
stocks in the remaining months. A more detailed analysis provides evidence that a fund-
size agency problem may drive this practice.
This paper also investigates whether window dressing practices affect funds’ returns.
Managers may have incentives to obtain total returns to benefit from the convex
performance-flow relationship and attract larger flows of money. Several tests seem to show
that any good strategy in intra-quarter periods do not compensate trading costs and do not lead
to superior returns.
Furthermore, we relate our results with another well-known investing strategy analyzed
in the literature, such as the January effect. There is extensive research on the participa-
tion of mutual funds in this January return anomaly (e.g. Haugen and Lakonishok (1988),
Lee et al. (1998), Musto (1997), and Sias and Starks (1997), among others) but the role
of fund managers remains a compelling question in the literature. However, unlike the
U.S. mutual funds, Spanish funds own a low share of the Spanish stock capitalization.
Our results show that the abnormally high buying activity of small-cap stocks in January
probably means a trading pattern to benefit from the January effect rather than creating
this return anomaly.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two describes the database and explores
the intra-quarter round-trip missing trades. Section three examines whether mutual funds
manage differently their portfolios around disclosures, the effect on the fund returns and the
relation with other variables such as size or past return. Section four investigates the role of
fund managers in a well-known investing pattern as the January effect is. This paper ends with
the main conclusions of the research.
2 Data and Intra-Quarter Trades
2.1 Data
The database used in this paper consists of monthly portfolio reports of all Spanish
domestic equity funds from December 1999 to December 2006.3 The regulator, the
Spanish Securities Exchange Commission (CNMV) supplied us with the database. The
data are free of the well-known survivorship and look-ahead biases. The initial sample
includes 163 funds that report at least one year of monthly holdings. From this
sample we eliminate funds that do not meet the main official investment requirement
of this category; that is, funds which held less than 75 % of their assets in Spanish
stock exchange in any month in order to ensure that all portfolios analyzed were
appropriately classified as Spanish domestic equity funds. The final database consists
of 125 Spanish domestic equity funds and 7,032 fund months, with an average of 56
monthly reports per fund and at least 91 funds each month. About 90 % of the assets
under management of domestic equity funds is controlled in the sample.
3 According to the Spanish Collective Investment and Pension Funds Association (INVERCO), the number of
Spanish domestic equity funds stood at 122 out of 2,794 existing in the Spanish mutual fund industry at the end
of 2006, which represents about 5% of assets under management of the overall market. Despite this low fraction,
it is important to note that this domestic category is the most active participant of the fund industry in the Spanish
stock exchange markets, holding more than 50% of the total assets invested by mutual funds in Spanish stocks.
This result explains the relevance of this fund category to analyze mutual fund trading. Detailed statistics are
available upon request.
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The CNMV provides this monthly information, thereby overcoming the problem of
reporting selection bias, which may be present in the scarce research on high
frequency portfolios where mutual funds voluntarily supply their reports to private
data providers (Elton et al. 2010; Liao et al. 2010). Our database is not available to
retail and institutional investors, and CNMV provides this information exclusively to
the authors for research purposes.4 Therefore, managers could not anticipate the
release of these undisclosed intra-quarter portfolios. The characteristics of our database
are greatly adequate for the precepts of Musto (1999) who highlights the need of
having disclosed and undisclosed portfolios to analyze window dressing.
The present study carefully identifies all of the portfolio holdings through the Interna-
tional Securities Identification Numbering (ISIN) codes. Panel A of Table 1 shows the
portfolio composition of domestic stocks in the sample. The classification procedure
begins by classifying the stocks traded on the last day of each quarter into two groups:
the stocks belonging to the Spanish benchmark Ibex-35 (Ibex) and the other stocks
(NoIbex). Then the procedure sorts the stocks within each initial group into two sub-
groups according to market capitalization: large and small. The large subgroup represents
approximately 60 % of the total group’s market capitalization, and the small subgroup
contains the remaining 40 %. Thus, the procedure obtains four groups: Ibex_Large,
Ibex_Small, NoIbex_Large, and NoIbex_Small.5
Note that the funds show a strong preference for large and well-known Spanish stocks,
as nearly 90 % of the domestic portfolio sample belongs to Ibex-35 (Ibex_Large and
Ibex_Small). Despite the low portfolio weights of NoIbex stocks, a comprehensive study
must analyze these securities to obtain accurate evidence regarding the overall trading
activities in the Spanish equity funds and their impact on the price patterns of the market.
In addition, the increase in the portfolio weights of the smallest cap stocks
(NoIbex_Small) is also remarkable, as these percentages tripled from December 1999 to
December 2006.6
According to Table 1 (Panel B), the aggregate portfolio holds every stock listed in Ibex-35.
These aggregate holdings also contain, on average, 90 % and 75 % of NoIbex_Large and
NoIbex_Small stocks, respectively. However, in terms of market capitalization, these figures
show the rather limited role of domestic equity funds in the Spanish stock market, as these
funds own less than 2 % of the total value of each stock group.7
4 One may think why mutual fund managers disclose the monthly tape of their potential manipulation if they are
aware that these reports will be probed by CNMV, and scrutinized by researchers. There are two main arguments
that approve the validity of the database. First, as far as we know, the use of this information was unique and
exclusive for the authors of this paper. Further applications to update this confidential information were rejected
by the regulator, which questions whether managers might be aware of potential data analyses. Second, the
systematic intra-month portfolio manipulation could involve important and additional transaction costs for equity
funds in the case of removing any window dressing evidence from monthly disclosures.
5 The remaining holdings average less than 25% of the portfolio sample and contain a wide range of foreign
stocks, investment societies, and other mutual fund units. The study does not analyze these assets because of both
the assorted nature of them, and the residual impact on the investment goal of domestic equity funds, which is
focused on Spanish common stocks.
6 There are not significant differences in the percentages displayed by Table 1 between quarter-end portfolios vs.
other month-end portfolios. Detailed information is available upon request.
7 This low percentage might suggest that other Spanish fund categories could largely increase this figure.
However, according to additional statistics that are not reported in this study, the Spanish fund industry owns
about 7% of the Spanish stock capitalization (December 2006).
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2.2 The Impact of Intra-Quarter Trades
To highlight the importance of using monthly information rather than quarterly data, this study
examines the number of missing trades that result from using quarterly portfolio reports.
According to Elton et al. (2010), the procedure for computing the portfolio turnover in month j
is:
Cþj ¼
X
i
N ij−Nij−1
 
P¯ij for all i;where Nij−Nij−1
 
≥0 ð1Þ
C−j ¼
X
i
N ij−Nij−1
 
P¯ij for all i;where Nij−Nij−1
 
< 0 ð2Þ
where Nij is the number of shares of stock i held at the end of month j, and Pij is the
average of stock i’s prices at the beginning and the end of month j.
The annual turnover is the smaller of either purchases (C+) or sales (C−) divided
by the average of the portfolio’s net asset value over the previous year, where:
Cþ ¼
X
j¼1
12
Cþj ð3Þ
Table 1 Portfolio characteristics of Spanish domestic equity funds. This table reports the portfolio characteristics
of the fund sample. Panel A displays the portfolio composition of the domestic stocks after the classification into
four size groups (Ibex_Large, Ibex_Small, NoIbex_Large, and NoIbex_Small). This classification sorts the
stocks into two groups: those that belong to the Spanish benchmark Ibex-35 (Ibex) and the remaining
(NoIbex). Next, the procedure divides each group into large-cap stocks (Large) and small-cap stocks (Small).
The Large subgroup represents approximately 60 % of the total group’s market capitalization. Panel B divides the
stocks by size groups and shows the proportion of listed stocks held by the sample (% Held) and the fraction of
the Spanish stock market capitalization owned by the sample (% Owned). These figures correspond to the last
day of December in each year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Panel A: Portfolio composition of domestic stocks
Ibex_Large 46.8 % 51.2 % 40.4 % 35.0 % 39.9 % 35.2 % 32.6 % 35.6 %
Ibex_Small 41.1 % 41.2 % 52.2 % 54.0 % 48.7 % 48.4 % 49.6 % 45.5 %
NoIbex_Large 5.6 % 3.8 % 1.8 % 4.1 % 2.7 % 4.4 % 4.8 % 2.7 %
NoIbex_Small 6.6 % 3.9 % 5.5 % 7.0 % 8.8 % 12.0 % 12.9 % 16.2 %
Panel B: Stock distribution
Ibex_Large
% Held 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %
% Owned 1.0 % 0.8 % 0.6 % 0.6 % 0.7 % 0.7 % 0.8 % 0.8 %
Ibex_Small
% Held 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %
% Owned 1.9 % 1.5 % 1.3 % 1.2 % 1.2 % 1.4 % 1.4 % 1.1 %
NoIbex_Large
% Held 91.7 % 83.3 % 66.7 % 91.7 % 91.7 % 91.7 % 100.0 % 75.0 %
% Owned 0.4 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.6 % 0.6 % 0.3 %
NoIbex_Small
% Held 76.6 % 76.6 % 71.4 % 59.8 % 73.5 % 80.5 % 76.6 % 74.7 %
% Owned 1.2 % 0.6 % 0.7 % 0.6 % 1.0 % 1.8 % 2.1 % 1.6 %
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C− ¼
X
j¼1
12
C−j ð4Þ
To obtain the annual turnover using quarterly portfolios, the estimation of Eq. (3) and
(4) uses four quarterly changes in the holdings, instead of 12 monthly variations.
The annual turnover in the sample based on the monthly data is 51 %, whereas the
annual turnover for the quarterly portfolios is 32 %. These results indicate that the use of
quarterly data discards 38 % of the trading observations from the monthly data. This
finding supports the evidence that monthly portfolios significantly reduce the impact of
intra-quarter round-trip trades on the empirical analyses of mutual fund trading (Elton
et al. 2010).
To further understand the relevance of these intra-quarter trades, this study aims to
disentangle the impact on fund returns of these missing trades between reporting
schedules which are not directly observed when looking at the quarterly holding
reports. According to Kacperczyk et al. (2008), we obtain the hypothetical monthly
returns from quarterly holding reports (HMR_QR) and the hypothetical monthly
returns from monthly holding reports (HMR_MR). The daily return of the fund k’s
holdings for each trading day t (RHk,t) is computed as the total return of a hypo-
thetical buy-and-hold strategy which invests in the most recent portfolio holdings
report:
RHk;t ¼
X
i¼1
j
ωi;t−1Ri;t ð5Þ
where ωi;t−1 is the portfolio weight of asset i on day t-1; Ri,t is the return of asset i on
day t; and j is the total number of assets in the portfolio.
Each report shows the assets invested the last day of the period (t=0). However, the
portfolio weights are only valid on the corresponding reporting day. It is necessary to
estimate the daily portfolio weights for the subsequent days. As this estimation is
performed under the assumption of a buy-and-hold strategy, it is necessary the daily
updating of the portfolio weights according to the returns on all the assets included in the
most recent portfolio report.8
From the daily RH obtained with disclosed quarterly reports, we estimate the hypothetical
monthly returns obtained by the fund over the next 3 months (HMR_QR). Similarly, the
hypothetical monthly returns over the next month (HMR_MR) are based on undisclosed
monthly reports. We end up with 4,555 hypothetical monthly return observations. The average
HMR_MR (0.34 %) is higher than the average HMR_QR (0.32 %), but this difference is not
statistically significant (p-value=0.67). This finding suggests that the intra-quarter round trip
trades of Spanish domestic equity funds have not a significant impact on fund returns.
8 These daily asset returns are calculated from different datasets of daily closing prices. These returns are adjusted
by dividends, stock splits and seasoned equity offerings. Spanish stock data are obtained from the Madrid Stock
Exchange and European stock data are provided by Reuters DataLink. Fixed-income daily returns are provided
by Analistas Financieros Internacionales (AFI). Finally, a low percentage of fund total assets (about 3%) are non-
controlled securities, which together with cash and cash equivalents receive a zero return.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Mutual Funds Trading and Portfolio Reports
Mutual fund trading at the end of the performance reporting periods attracts considerable
attention within the empirical literature. If managers plan their investment decisions according
to the fund reporting schedule, the disclosed portfolios may reveal an uninformative image of
the recent management of the fund. According to the straightforward approach of Musto
(1999), empirical analyses must test the differences between the investment decisions made
around the reporting dates and the decisions made throughout the rest of the year to determine
whether managers intentionally manipulate the portfolios around the public reports.
Window-dressing practices may imply that higher levels of trading occur prior to reporting
dates (Elton et al. 2010; Meier and Schaumburg 2006). Therefore, it is necessary to explore the
intensity of mutual fund trading throughout the calendar year, and to search for abnormal
trading patterns around the quarterly disclosures.
Following this first approach to window dressing, Table 2 reports the aggregate turnover
ratios (Eqs. 1 to 4) for each month, quarter, and half-year. Trading activity is significantly
higher (6.40 %) during the first half of the year than in the second half. In fact, managers
engage in abnormally high trading just before the reporting dates in the first half of the year
(March, 41.31 %; June, 39.58 %).
While paying special attention to the year-end, the findings show that the turnover in
December (30.81 %) is the smallest in the year, with the only exception being the August
turnover (24.09 %). This low turnover reflects the dampening effect of the summer holidays on
fund management.
Although previous evidence on portfolio manipulation in the U.S. fund market is especially
relevant at the end of the year (Lakonishok et al. 1991; Ng and Wang 2004; Elton et al. 2010;
He et al. 2004), the lack of evidence for significant trading in December might imply that
Spanish managers do not actively manipulate their portfolios in this month. Unlike the U.S.
fund industry, Spanish funds all have the same fiscal year-end: December, and the low
turnover in December also suggests that mutual funds do not engage in tax-motivated trading.
This assumption gains strength because under Spanish tax law (Law 43/1995, of December 27,
and the Royal Decree 4/2004, of March 5), mutual funds are not entitled to any tax deductions
and benefit from a small corporate tax rate (1 %), which reduces tax-motivated trades around
the end of the year. Hence, Spanish mutual funds do not appear to have a motivation to engage
in tax-motivated trading at year-end.
But the analysis of window dressing hypothesis should further analyze the management
activity displayed by the portfolio turnover. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the charac-
teristics of the stocks that funds sell, buy, and hold each month to test whether managers trade
in disguise around the disclosure dates. The first step consists in sorting the domestic stocks by
their cumulative returns over the previous 11 months. These return records complement the
four stock groups according to market capitalization (i.e., Ibex_Large, Ibex_Small,
NoIbex_Large, and NoIbex_Small).
To evaluate the potential interaction between size and performance, the next stage obtains
the 11-month return quartiles within each size group, that is, 16 performance-size subgroups.
However, to obtain clearer results, this study only analyzes the extreme quartiles (i.e., Winners
and Losers), which should be the most susceptible to portfolio manipulation. This classifica-
tion provides eight equally-weighted subgroups: Ibex_LargeW, Ibex_LargeL, Ibex_SmallW,
Ibex_SmallL, NoIbex_LargeW, NoIbex_LargeL, NoIbex_SmallW, and NoIbex_SmallL.
These subgroups are rebalanced each quarter.
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This study follows the approach of Ng and Wang (2004) to identify the stocks that
managers buy and sell more intensively around the disclosure schedule. This method computes
the value of the monthly holdings, sales, and purchases of each stock group for each mutual
fund.
The sell ratio measures fund k’s selling activities in stock group i in month j:
Sell ratio ¼ SELL i; j; kð Þ=HOLD i; j−1; kð ÞX
i
SELL i; j; kð Þ=
X
i
HOLD i; j−1; kð Þ ð6Þ
where SELL(i, j, k) are the fund k’s sales in month j and in stock group i, and HOLD(i, j-1, k)
is the value of the holdings at the end of the previous month of the same stock group i in month
j. The values of SELL and HOLD use the average stock prices between the beginning and end
of month j.
The numerator in Eq. 6 is the ratio of the sales in stock group i to the holdings of the same
group i at the end of the previous month, while the denominator is the ratio of the total sales of
all stock groups in month j to all stock holdings at the end of the previous month. That is, the
sell ratio measures the selling activity of the fund in a given stock group relative to the overall
selling activity of the fund in month j. Suppose that a manager sells 600,000€ out of 1,000,000
€ held in Ibex_Large stocks. In addition, this manager sells 150,000€ out of 700,000€ held in
Ibex_Small stocks, 40,000€ out of 200,000€ held in NoIbex_Large stocks, and 10,000€ out of
100,000€ held in NoIbex_Small stocks. Therefore, according to Eq. 6, the manager sells 60 %
of the Ibex_Large group held in the portfolio but only sells 40 % of the total stock holdings.
That is, the sell ratio for the Ibex_Large group is 1.5, which means that this fund sells 50 %
more of Ibex_Large than the overall selling activity.
Similarly, the buy ratio measures fund k’s buying activities in stock group i in month j:
Buy ratio ¼ BUY i; j; kð Þ=HOLD i; j; kð ÞX
i
BUY i; j; kð Þ=
X
i
HOLD i; j; kð Þ ð7Þ
where BUY(i, j, k) are the fund k’s purchases in month j in stock group i, and HOLD(i, j, k) is
the value of fund k’s holdings in month j in stock group i. Again, the BUY and HOLD
variables use the average of the stock prices at the beginning and end of month j. Therefore, the
buy ratio shows the proportion of the fund’s purchases of stock group i during month j relative
to the proportion of the fund’s total purchases across all stock groups.
To complement the aforementioned measures of trading intensity, this study proposes a new
complementary approach that allows the identification of the intensity of the changes in the
portfolio allocations to the different stock groups. The importance of this method lies in the
additional information reported because this measure compares the trading patterns of the
different stock groups with the trading patterns of the entire portfolio. Whereas Ng and Wang
(2004) analyze the buying/selling activity of funds, this approach explores the changes in the
final portfolio weights that funds report to unit-holders. This new insight captures the overall
effect on the stock weights disclosed to investors, which mainly determine the portfolio image.
The portfolio share decrease/increase ratios by fund k in stock group i during
month j:
Share decrease ¼ SHARE i; j; kð Þ−SHARE i; j−1; kð Þ½ 
−
AVERAGEi SHARE i; j; kð Þ−SHARE i; j−1; kð Þ½ − ð8Þ
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Share increase ¼ SHARE i; j; kð Þ−SHARE i; j−1; kð Þ½ 
þ
AVERAGEi SHARE i; j; kð Þ−SHARE i; j−1; kð Þ½ þ
ð9Þ
where SHARE(i, j, k) is the percentage of the portfolio invested by fund k in stock group i in
month j. Equation 8 is valid for [SHARE(i, j, k) - SHARE(i, j-1, k)]<0. Similarly, Eq. 9 applies
if the difference [SHARE(i, j, k) - SHARE(i, j-1, k)] is positive.
With respect to the share increases, the numerator in Eq. 9 shows the increase in the
portfolio share of stock group i in month j over the share in the previous month. The
denominator is the average of the increases in all of the stock groups during month j.
Therefore, this ratio compares the increase intensity of stock group i during month j with
respect to the average increments in fund k’s portfolio allocations. Suppose a fund that holds
10 %, 60 %, 30 %, and 0 % of its portfolio in Ibex_Large, Ibex_Small, NoIbex_Large, and
NoIbex_Small stocks, respectively, in month j-1. The same fund holds 40 %, 15 %, 35 %, and
10 %, respectively, in month j. That is, the fund has increased 30 % of its portfolio allocation to
the Ibex_Large group, but the average increment in the portfolio weights is 15 % (i.e. 30 % of
Ibex_Large stocks, 5 % of NoIbex_Large stocks, and 10 % of NoIbex_Small stocks). The
share increase ratio for Ibex_Large stocks is 2.0, which means that this fund increases its
portfolio allocations to these stocks at twice the average increments of the remaining alloca-
tions. In this case, the share decrease ratio (Eq. 8) for Ibex_Small stocks is 1.0, given that it is
the only underweighting of stocks in month j.
This study uses both trading activity and portfolio allocation measures to test whether
trading differs between the disclosure months (March, June, September, and December),
which are denoted hereafter as Qs, and the other eight months, which are denoted hereafter
as OM. Table 3 reports the differences in the equally weighted averages of all of the ratios for
each stock group across the funds (i.e., Qs – OM). Comparing the results in Panels A and B,
the buy/sell and share increase/decrease ratios are mostly consistent with respect to the sign of
the difference. That is, the changes in the final portfolio allocations are consistent with the
trading activity of funds. However, the proposed measures of share increase/decrease might
provide more useful results in testing the window-dressing hypothesis because these ratios
analyze the change of the portfolio image by considering the final portfolio weights that funds
must report to investors.
With regard to size groups, funds tend to increase their portfolio allocations to Ibex_Small
more intensively during the disclosure months than during the rest of the year. In contrast,
funds increase their allocations to NoIbex_Small less intensively during the disclosure months
than during the remaining periods.
However, the results are much more interesting when combining size and recent returns
because some aggregate results for the size groups are a combination of the opposite patterns
among the return subgroups. For instance, the analysis finds contrary and significant results in
the high and low return quartiles of Ibex_Large. These results show that funds tend to increase
their portfolio shares of return-winner large stocks (Ibex_LargeW) more in the reporting
periods than in the other months. In contrast, funds tend to decrease their shares of these
stocks more during the other periods than in the disclosure periods. However, the opposite
occurs with return-loser large stocks (Ibex_LargeL); the share increase ratios are higher in the
non-reporting months, and the share decrease ratios are higher in the disclosure months. Both
ratios have statistically significant differences (Diff) at the 1 % level. Furthermore, the finding
related to the Ibex_LargeL stocks is the most robust result because the funds also show a clear
intention to buy these stocks more actively in the non-reporting months (see the significant buy
ratio in Panel A). This practice suggests that funds avoid well-known and large cap stocks with
poor past return records in their mandatory reports.
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The results for the Ibex_Small group are in line with those for the Ibex_Large group. Funds
treat the extreme return-winners and losers differently. That is, managers tend to increase their
shares of high-performance stocks (Ibex_SmallW) more in the reporting months than during
the rest of the year, but the managers show the opposite behavior for return-loser stocks
(Ibex_SmallL).
These findings regarding Ibex-35 stocks suggest that funds have quarter-end image strat-
egies that differ from those undisclosed portfolios of the remaining months. This conclusion is
especially relevant because these blue-chip stocks play a leading role in the portfolios of the
sample according to Table 1. The results indicate that during the reporting months, managers
prefer large-cap and well-known stocks (i.e., Ibex-35 stocks) and have incentives to increase
the disclosed portfolio weights of return-winners and decrease the weights of return-losers,
especially those largest capitalization Ibex-35 stocks.
These results are consistent with the window-dressing hypothesis. That is, managers intend to
improve the fund image by increasing the disclosedweights ofwell-known and return-winner stocks
and decreasing the portfolio weights of well-known stocks with poor return records.
Table 3 Differences between the disclosure dates and the other months: Dec. 1999 through Dec. 2006. At the
end of each quarter, this study sorts the stocks into two groups: those that belong to the Spanish benchmark Ibex-
35 (Ibex) and the remaining (NoIbex). Next, the procedure divides each group into large-cap stocks (Large) and
small-cap stocks (Small). The Large subgroup represents approximately 60 % of the total group’s market
capitalization. Additionally, the method sorts these stocks in relation to the previous 11-month cumulative
returns. Then, this procedure obtains the top (W) and bottom (L) 11-month return quartiles within the four size
subgroups. Panel A shows the equally weighted average of the trading activity ratios (Eqs. 6 and 7) across the
funds for the disclosure months (Qs) and the other months (OM). Panel B reports the same structure for the
portfolio weight ratios (Eqs. 8 and 9). (Diff) shows the difference between the values in Qs and OM for each
measure. Finally, four performance quartiles in relation to the previous 11-month cumulative returns are obtained:
Winner, Medium-Winner, Medium-Loser, and Loser
Panel A: Measures of trading activity Panel B: Measures of portfolio weights
Sell ratio Buy ratio Share decrease ratio Share increase ratio
Qs OM Diff Qs OM Diff Qs OM Diff Qs OM Diff
Ibex_Large 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.76 0.82 −0.06* 2.04 2.04 0.00 2.02 2.09 −0.07
Ibex_LargeW 1.52 1.31 0.21 1.37 1.49 −0.12 2.02 2.21 −0.19* 2.12 1.96 0.16*
Ibex_LargeL 1.75 1.67 0.08 1.63 2.18 −0.55** 2.29 1.93 0.36** 2.22 2.46 −0.24**
Ibex_Small 1.30 1.30 0.00 1.26 1.23 0.03 0.91 0.90 0.01 0.95 0.90 0.05**
Ibex_SmallW 1.51 1.68 −0.17* 1.46 1.50 −0.04 0.94 0.98 −0.04 0.97 0.90 0.07**
Ibex_SmallL 1.51 1.43 0.08 1.58 1.47 0.11 0.82 0.79 0.03 0.78 0.88 −0.10**
NoIbex_Large 3.84 3.96 −0.12 4.03 4.33 −0.30 0.95 0.95 0.00 0.92 0.87 0.05
NoIbex_LargeW 4.74 4.80 −0.06 4.38 6.02 −1.64** 1.05 1.21 −0.16 0.95 0.98 −0.03
NoIbex_LargeL 4.03 3.99 0.04 5.18 5.71 −0.53 0.85 0.70 0.15** 0.90 0.91 −0.01
NoIbex_Small 3.11 3.02 0.09 2.78 2.92 −0.14 0.60 0.61 −0.01 0.56 0.62 −0.06*
NoIbex_SmallW 4.69 3.69 1.00 3.10 3.59 −0.49 0.74 0.79 −0.05 0.63 0.71 −0.08*
NoIbex_SmallL 4.13 3.64 0.49 2.88 3.33 −0.45 0.53 0.52 0.01 0.48 0.58 −0.10**
Winner 1.42 1.50 −0.08 1.32 1.42 −0.10* 0.98 1.05 −0.07** 0.94 0.94 0.00
Medium-Winner 1.06 1.04 0.02 0.96 1.03 −0.07** 0.99 1.00 −0.01 1.01 1.01 0.00
Medium-Loser 1.07 1.04 0.03 1.03 1.02 0.01 0.99 0.97 0.02 1.06 0.96 0.10**
Loser 1.18 1.11 0.07 1.29 1.14 0.15** 0.94 0.92 0.02 0.93 1.02 −0.09**
* 5 % significant; ** 1 % significant
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The results for NoIbex stocks suggest that funds tend to increase the portfolio shares of the
smallest stocks (NoIbex_Small), especially loser stocks, more actively in those months without
portfolio reports. Although this study does not find a clear tendency toward selling and
decreasing the portfolio shares of NoIbex stocks in the disclosure months, the results could
loosely be in accordance with the window-dressing hypothesis.
The analysis of undisclosed portfolios let us conclude that Spanish domestic equity funds
show intra-quarter trading missed using disclosed holdings. However, the differential trading
that managers follow hardly compensate fees as we stated in section 2.2. Musto (1999) already
pointed out that window dressing would involve higher transaction costs in equity funds than
in other categories such as money market funds. Next section further investigates the effect of
unobserved mutual fund trades on fund returns.
3.2 Implications of Unobserved Mutual Fund Trades on Fund Performance
One of the motivations that managers have to trade their portfolios differently in undisclosed
periods is to benefit from the convex performance-flow relationship for mutual funds (e.g.
Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), among others). Managers might try to improve
the disclosed portfolio image to create the impression that the fund is performing relatively
well to attract larger money inflows from investors (He et al. 2004; Lakonishok et al. 1991;
Morey and O’Neal 2006; Musto 1999; Ng and Wang 2004; Ortiz et al. 2012), who mostly
make their investment decisions based on recent performance records (Sirri and Tufano 1998).
This attitude could lead to an important agency problem because fund management might be
biased to total return instead of pursuing good performance. Being aware of investors’ decision
making process, managers’ goal is attracting more assets under management to be rewarded
accordingly. Then, any intra-quarter unobserved mutual fund trade should be aimed at total
returns directly observed by investors. If investors are likely to focus on monthly mutual funds
returns in making their investment decisions, it is necessary to check for the monthly mutual
fund total returns of the most aggressive intra-period traders.
Panel data of monthly total fund returns are regressed against monthly turnover ratios to
detect any significant relation between trading activity and performance. The first panel data
regression considers all the funds included in the sample (6,894 observations); the results reject
a significant relation between monthly returns and monthly turnover ratios (coefficient=
0.00205 with a p-value=0.251). We also run the same panel data but only considering those
funds included in the first quartile of average monthly turnover. This analysis should further
isolate the effect of the most aggressive mutual funds into their total monthly returns (1,186
observations). These results provide evidence of a negative although non-significant relation
between intra-quarter trading activity and monthly total returns (coefficient=−0.00129 with a
p-value=0.345).9
Therefore, according to above results, the missing trades do not have a significant impact on
monthly mutual fund returns, even for those funds with higher levels of monthly trading
activity.
9 We obtain Fama-MacBeth standard errors, White consistent standard errors, and OLS standard errors clustered
by fund, by time, and by both fund and time. According to Petersen (2008), the comparison of these panel data
standard errors leads us to accept the existence of a time effect in the panel data regression for the full sample.
This effect may be controlled by using the correct confidence intervals based on the Fama-MacBeth and OLS
standard errors clustered by time. However, the same procedure rejects any fund and time effect when the most
aggressive intra-quarter funds are considered in the panel data regression. Detailed information regarding the
standard error estimates is available on request.
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We carry out an additional analysis to try to disentangle the potential effect of unobserved
mutual fund trading practices on funds’ returns. A two-sample variance comparison test
provides evidence that mutual fund returns are significantly less volatile in the non-reporting
months (sd=4.665 %) than in the remaining periods (sd=5.622 %). In terms of return, a two-
sample mean comparison test finds that monthly returns are significantly higher in the non-
reporting periods (mean=1.348 %) than in the reporting periods (mean=−0.523 %). Therefore,
these findings support that the apparently different trading practice in the reporting periods
seems to affect negatively to performance of equity funds.10
Related to unobserved trading is worth noting the confidential story recently addressed by
Agarwal et al. (2013), which supports that managers may hide their most valuable information
in portfolio reports. This confidential hypothesis is based on quarter-end portfolio holdings
which are allowed to be disclosed with a delay up to 1 year. The confidential treatment by U.S.
SEC relied on the argument that copycat competitors could mimic the disclosed strategies
impeding fair competition.
This confidential behavior is restricted in the Spanish fund industry. Portfolio holdings file
must be sent to CNMVwith a maximum lag of 30 days since the quarter-end. But the nature of
this confidential hypothesis still holds for our sample of undisclosed portfolios; managers
would be motivated to sell those stocks with superior returns to avoid mimicking strategies
from competitors before reporting.
Table 3 rejects a significant selling activity at the last month of the quarter of those stocks
with the highest previous 11-month cumulative returns (winners). In fact, the results show that
the portfolio allocation to these winners decrease significantly more in other periods than in the
reporting months, which casts doubt on the significance of this confidential story in our
sample.
If we extend this analysis to other stock characteristics corresponding to greater
information asymmetry, Table 3 also rejects the existence of this confidential trading
story in smaller stocks such as NoIbex_Small stocks. This lack of evidence may make
sense in the Spanish fund industry because the confidential treatment by the market
regulator such as in the U.S. market seems to be necessary to appropriately justify
this behavior.
3.3 Further Evidence of Mutual Fund Trading
The conclusions drawn in previous section on unobserved mutual fund trades must be taken
with caution in a so concentrated Spanish fund industry where variables such as fund size, age
and recent returns could play an important role to drive equity fund trading. In this section we
test whether these results about mutual fund trading are consistent across several subsets of
funds with assorted characteristics that might imply different trading incentives.
Brown et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence that an agency problem creates incentives
to add variance to the portfolios of smaller and younger equity funds as a consequence of the
convex relationship between past returns and net money flows. According to Musto (1999),
this agency problem might be also present in the analysis of window dressing hypothesis
because smaller and younger funds might have important incentives to improve the portfolio
image to get better investors’ opinions about the fund and thereby gaining net money flows to
10 Both hypotheses were tested at 95% confidence interval. The mean comparison test uses Welch’s
approximation to degrees of freedom due to the rejection of equal variance hypothesis. Detailed results of
these tests are available upon request. Further studies should verify in much more detail the consequences of
portfolio manipulation in terms of return and risk but this objective is beyond the goals of our paper.
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grow and survive. This hypothesis might be especially relevant in the very concentrated
Spanish fund industry as a consequence of the universal banking model where a large number
of small-sized funds compete against few large funds usually managed by large bank-owned
companies.11
We also extend the analysis to those funds with poor recent returns. These worse
performers might also have incentives to avoid investors’ suspicions of the quality of
recent management which could finally result in net money outflows of the fund. The
perception of investors interested in the explanatory factors of poor recent returns could
be an important incentive for managers to improve the disclosed portfolio image to
avoid the potential money outflows.
We follow the clustering approach of Musto (1999) to work with different subsets of funds.
For each monthly trade we compute the fund i size in month t minus the average fund size over
that month. This relative size is standardized sit minus the mean size and over the standard
deviation of all size observations. Then, the standardized fund age ai is similarly obtained.
Finally, for each monthly trade we obtain the past 3-month return for each fund i minus the
average 3-month return of all funds over month t. This relative 3-month return is standardized
rit minus the mean return and over the standard deviation of all return observations.
12 Table 4
repeats the same tests than Table 3 but clusters the difference estimates into six groups
according to the standardized values.13
Similarly to Table 3, the most interesting results are again appreciated in Ibex-35
stocks. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the aggregate evidence of window dressing for
these stocks previously reported in section 3.1 seems to be significantly driven by small
equity funds. This finding supports the hypothesis of Musto (1999) of a fund-size agency
problem in the fund trading around portfolio disclosures. The smallest equity funds
increased significantly less the portfolio weights of Ibex stocks with poor returns
(Ibex_LargeL and Ibex_SmallL) during disclosure months than in other periods, although
this practice may be extended to all funds for Ibex-SmallL stocks. Small equity funds also
increase significantly more the weights of return-winner Ibex_Small stocks
(Ibex_SmallW) in disclosure months than in other periods. On the left side of Table 4,
we find that the smallest equity funds decrease significantly less the portfolio weights of
the largest Ibex stocks with better returns (Ibex_LargeW) in those reporting months than in
other periods. Although Panel A of Table 4 does not report so clear results for NoIbex
stocks, the findings suggest that the smallest funds tend to increase the weights of the
smallest and loser stocks (NoIbex_SmallL) significantly more in those months without
portfolio reports. In addition, the smallest funds also decrease significantly more the
allocations to NoIbex_LargeL stocks in those reporting months.
These new results seem to verify that small equity funds aim to plan their trades around
report dates to improve the quarterly portfolio image to grow and survive in the concentrated
Spanish market, thereby supporting a fund-size agency problem in these fund trades in
disguise.
11 The ten largest out of the 102 Spanish fund companies existing in December 2006 managed more than 70% of
the total assets of the Spanish fund industry. The average fund size in Spain was about 89 million € while the
average fund size in the European industry was about 160 million € (Source: Inverco and European Fund and
Asset Management Association, International Statistical Release 2006:Q4).
12 Total fund assets and 3-month returns are officially provided by CNMV. The age of the funds is computed in
days since the inception dates officially registered in the CNMV.
13 According to section 3.1, the change of the portfolio image is better represented by the estimates of the
portfolio weight ratios (Equations 8 and 9). Table 4 omits the estimates of the trading activity ratios (Equations 6
and 7) previously displayed in Table 3 for the sake of brevity but this information is available upon request.
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On the other hand, we cannot find a consistent fund-age agency problem to explain
the trading patterns displayed by Panel B of Table 4. The lack of long return series
could be an important incentive for investors to analyze the quarterly portfolios as a
source of the recent performance. However, the empirical evidence of this hypothesis
could be severely distorted by the existence in our sample of experienced and small
funds managed by small-sized fund companies with more window dressing incentives
than other younger and larger funds managed by large bank-owned companies with a
robust sales force of mutual fund units.14
Finally, Panel C of Table 4 also questions the role of poor recent returns to explain
unobserved trading strategies of Spanish equity funds. This lack of evidence could be
explained because higher levels of stock substitution to improve the portfolio image
of poor performers around portfolio reports should result in extra transaction costs
which would push return records down even more. These additional costs would be
an important problem for equity managers to plan investment decisions according to
quarterly disclosure schedule. Furthermore, according to Musto (1999) the realized
returns of equity funds should be much more informative than return records of
money market funds, thereby questioning this fund-return agency problem in window
dressing of fund categories different to money funds.15
4 Fund Trading Strategies: Do Mutual Funds Benefit from the January Effect?
Several studies analyze the different incentives and the consequences of portfolio manipulation
on return patterns around reporting dates (Carhart et al. 2002; Gallagher et al. 2009; Bernhardt
and Davies 2005). In particular, past research has shown a special interest in the role of this
institutional practice in some well-known market anomalies, such as the January effect
(Haugen and Lakonishok 1988; Ackert and Athanassakos 2000; Ng and Wang 2004; Sias
and Starks 1997; Lee et al. 1998). This institutional trading may complement the extended
hypothesis of tax-motivated trades by individuals as the main explanation for the January
effect since the study of Dyl (1977). However, the role of Spanish institutional investors is
questionable, given that domestic equity funds own a low percentage of the stock market (see
Panel B of Table 1).
This paper provides further insights into the role of fund managers in the January
effect. That is, this section details fund trading in the first quarter to better understand
those trades causing the highest turnover ratio in the year, 42.12 % in January (see
Table 2). This result might initially reflect the potential participation of mutual funds
in the turn-of-the-year effect.
As the nature of this analysis only requires trading activities, Table 5 only reports
sell and buy ratios (Eqs. 6 and 7). Table 5 reveals that in January, managers focus
their trading activities on NoIbex stocks with a clear intention to purchase these
stocks. The buy ratio is significantly higher than the sell ratio for these stocks and
their extreme return subgroups. These differences are significant at the 1 % and 5 %
14 Descriptive statistics of the market concentration of the sample are available upon request.
15 We also run panel data regressions to test the robustness of the interaction between specific fund
characteristics and portfolio weight ratios (Equations 8 and 9). According to Petersen (2008), we
identify the correlations between the residuals across funds by comparing the standard errors obtained
via the different panel data methods. The results are consistent with the evidence reported by Table 4.
Detailed statistics are available upon request.
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levels, except for NoIbex_SmallL. These findings might be related to the cause of the
January effect in Spanish small-cap stocks (Ortiz et al. 2010).
We also obtain the €-value of the trades of our fund sample in January by comparing the
portfolios at the end of December and January (Eqs. 1 and 2). This analysis shows that the
trades of our sample are on average 2.67 % (1.11 %) of the overall Spanish market trading of
NoIbex (Ibex35) stocks in January.16 Spanish domestic equity funds do actively trade small-
cap stocks in January to take advantage of the subsequent rise in prices but cannot produce any
price pressure to be causing the return anomaly.
5 Conclusion
Recent research analyzes mutual fund trading around mandatory portfolio reports. However,
few studies use holdings data reported more frequently than on a quarterly basis. This
frequency could severely bias their conclusions because a relevant percentage of trades are
missing when quarterly holdings are used, thereby strengthening the use of monthly data for
appropriate tests of mutual fund trading. This paper examines a unique and official database of
monthly undisclosed portfolios to explore equity fund trading around portfolio disclosures. In
fact, the use of quarterly portfolios missed 38 % of the trading revealed using monthly
portfolios. However, the intra-quarter round trip trades do not significantly affect fund returns,
even for those funds with higher levels of monthly activity.
16 The sum of C+January and C
-
January is a conservative measure of the trading volume in January because it omits
the intra-January round-trip trades. However, according to Elton et al. (2010) this intra-month bias is expected to
be small because of the high transaction costs assumed by these trades. Total Spanish market trading has been
obtained from the Official Bulletins of the Spanish Stock Market. Detailed figures are omitted for the sake of
brevity.
Table 5 Investment activity in the first quarter: Dec. 1999 through Dec. 2006. This table reports the
equally weighted average of the buy and sell measures (Eqs. 6 and 7) across the funds during the first
quarter of the year for the different stock groups. The t-test examines the equality of means between the
buy and sell ratios (Diff (B, S))
January February March
Buy Sell Diff (B,S) Buy Sell Diff (B,S) Buy Sell Diff (B,S)
Ibex_Large 0.83 0.81 0.02 0.86 0.76 0.10 0.79 0.88 −0.09
Ibex_LargeW 1.94 1.62 0.31 1.03 1.38 −0.35* 1.35 1.66 −0.31
Ibex_LargeL 1.31 1.72 −0.41 1.34 1.26 0.08 1.57 1.55 0.03
Ibex_Small 1.14 1.27 −0.12** 1.26 1.31 −0.05 1.22 1.30 −0.08
Ibex_SmallW 1.41 1.61 −0.20 1.16 2.04 −0.88** 1.40 1.82 −0.42**
Ibex_SmallL 1.53 1.28 0.25 1.54 1.61 −0.07 1.47 1.67 −0.20
NoIbex_Large 6.28 3.43 2.85** 2.14 5.88 −3.74** 2.41 3.17 −0.76
NoIbex_LargeW 7.32 4.06 3.26* 3.46 9.71 −6.25** 3.93 4.43 −0.50
NoIbex_LargeL 9.35 3.48 5.87** 3.04 4.97 −1.94 4.29 3.27 1.02
NoIbex_Small 4.76 2.55 2.21* 3.27 2.52 0.76 2.38 2.94 −0.56
NoIbex_SmallW 5.62 2.54 3.08* 3.48 3.28 0.20 2.55 4.76 −2.20
NoIbex_SmallL 3.70 3.43 0.27 3.64 3.33 0.32 3.25 3.12 0.12
* 5 % significant; ** 1 % significant
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Trading ratios existing in the literature and our new portfolio measure aim to detect equity
funds trading activity around the quarterly portfolio reports. These patterns depend on both the
size and recent performance records of the stocks. Our new approach captures the general
trading effect on the stock weights, which better show a portfolio’s image.
The results for the large-cap and well-known Ibex-35 stocks suggest that funds tend to
rebalance their portfolios to increase the weights of the return-winner stocks and to decrease
the weights of the poor-return stocks in the disclosure months. Interestingly, non-disclosure
months show the opposite trend. These results are especially relevant because Ibex stocks play
a leading role in the fund portfolio holdings. However, the results for NoIbex stocks suggest
that funds tend to increase the weights of these small-cap stocks more actively in the non-
disclosure months. Thus, funds might trade in order to show well-known stocks in their
quarterly reports.
Our results also reject any intra-quarter confidential trading story which is based on those
portfolio holdings allowed by the U.S. SEC to be disclosed with a certain delay. This lack of
evidence makes sense in Spain because this confidential treatment is not allowed by the
Spanish regulator.
The paper finds evidence of a fund-size agency problem to explain fund unobserved trading
in the Spanish concentrated market. Small equity funds are involved in intra-quarter trading,
but no significant results are found in relation with the age of the fund and the past fund
returns.
Our database allows the analysis of the influence of January effect on mutual fund
trading. During the first quarter of the year, funds mainly concentrate on trading
NoIbex stocks. The results indicate that funds actively participate in the January
effect, especially by purchasing small-cap stocks. However, domestic equity funds
own a residual capitalization percentage of Spanish listed companies. This finding
suggests that funds might take advantage of the January effect rather than causing this
return anomaly.
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